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Note: Letters of Credit: Injunction As A Remedy For
Fraud In U.C.C. Section 5-114
I. INTRODUCTION
The letter of credit is an extremely useful device for facilitating
complex international and domestic business transactions.' Although
issued in a great variety of forms, 2 the modem letter of credit may
be basically defined as a written instrument, issued by a bank or
other financial institution, in which the issuer promises to honor
drafts presented by a specified beneficiary in compliance with the
terms of the credit.' The customer requesting the bank to issue the
letter of credit in turn promises to reimburse the issuer, and pay it a
commission for issuing the credit.'
The basic letter of credit arrangement involves three parties: the
issuer, the customer, and the beneficiary. 5 These parties are engaged
1. Letters of credit have played a major role in the financing of trade in goods,
at least since the twelfth century, and perhaps as far back as the time of the Phoeni-
cians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Greeks. Wiley, How to Use Letters of Credit in
Financing the Sale of Goods, 20 Bus. LAw. 495 (1965). In recent years, as much as
ninety percent of the United States' merchandise imports have been financed by
letters of credit. W. HAwKL&ND, 2 A TRANSACTIONAL Gumn TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 791 (1964); Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 1404, 1407 (1971). In the last few decades,
inventive financiers have adapted letters of credit to a large variety of domestic trans-
actions as well. Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.
L.J. 251, 252 (1972).
2. The forms that a letter of credit can take are as varied as the transactions to
which it is adapted. In addition to basic sales contracts, letters of credit are now used
as adjuncts to construction contracts, corporate consolidations, and the issuance of
commercial paper. They are also in current use instead of, or in connection with, bid
and performance bonds, escrow accounts, stock transfers and purchases, and leases of
real and personal property. Even the common charge card has been said to be no more
than a plastic letter of credit. Harfield, supra note 1, at 252.
3. See generally H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDrrs AND AccEFTANcEs 27 (5th ed. 1974);
B. KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL Lm'raas OF CREDrr IN THE AMERICAS 9, 599 (1966). The
Uniform Commercial Code defines the letter of credit as "an engagement by a bank
or other person made at the request of a customer. . . that the issuer will honor drafts
or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the
credit. . . ." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a).
For earlier common law definitions of letters of credit, see Second Nat'l Bank v.
M. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F.2d 963, 966 (2d Cir. 1926); Border Nat'l Bank v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1922); Lafargue v. Harrison, 70 Cal. 380, 383-
84, 9 P. 259, 261 (1885); Liggett v. Levy, 233 Mo. 590, 598, 136 S.W. 299, 301 (1911).
4. The commission is usually one-eighth of one percent of the amount of the
draft. Annot., supra note 1, at 1406.
5. These three principal parties are defined by the Code as follows:
(c) An "issuer" is a bank or other person issuing a credit.
(d) A "beneficiary" of a credit is a person who is entitled under its terms to
draw or demand payment.
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in three contractual relationships.' First, there is the "underlying
contract," the business agreement between the customer and the
beneficiary. Usually, this contract contains, in addition to the sub-
stantive terms concerning the sale of goods or the rendering of serv-
ices, a description of the agreed upon letter of credit arrangement.
Second, there is a contract between the issuing bank and its cus-
tomer, whereby the bank agrees to issue the letter of credit to the
beneficiary and the customer agrees to reimburse the bank for the
amount paid out under the credit plus a commission. Finally, there
is the letter of credit itself,7 an agreement between the issuer and the
beneficiary in which the bank promises to honor the beneficiary's
drafts if they are accompanied by certain documents specified in the
credit.'
Basic to the law of letters of credit is the rule of independent
contracts.' The credit contract between the issuer and the beneficiary
(g) A "customer" is a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to issue a
credit. The term also includes a bank which procures issuance or confirma-
tion on behalf of that bank's'customer.
U.C.C. § 5-103(1).
Often, however, there will be more than one bank involved in a letter of credit
transaction. Section 5-103(1) defines two of the most common ancillary parties to the
basic tripartite agreement:
(e) An "advising bank" is a bank which gives notification of the issuance of
a credit by another bank.
(f) A "confirming bank" is a bank which engages either that it will itself
honor a credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be
honored by the issuer or a third bank.
Id. § 5-103(1). See also H. RmuqEm, supra note 3, at 33-38; B. KOZOLcHYK, supra note
3, at 12-13. When referring to parties in a letter of credit transaction, this Note will
conform to the U.C.C. definitions.
6. See, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d
Cir. 1970); Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991,
995 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
7. But see J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCAL CODE § 18-2 (1972) (because beneficiary does not enter into any agreement
directly with issuer, letter of credit itself is not, strictly speaking, a contract). See also
H. HARFIELD, supra note 3, at 51-55.
8. Aside from the draft or demand for payment, the documents required under
a letter of credit vary greatly because their form and content are determined by the
business context in which the credit is used. A commercial credit will ordinarily require
the beneficiary to present bills of lading (or other documents of title), invoices, or
insurance papers. J. WHTE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 7, § 18-1, at 604 n.9. Where
appropriate, a commercial credit may also require presentment of consular invoices,
certificates of weight or quality, and an export or import license. See H. HAiRmFIi,
supra note 3, at 56-57. See also note 41 infra.
Some letters of credit require no documentation and allow the beneficiary to draw
simply upon presentment of a draft. See H. HAR~uLD, supra note 3, at 56-57. The use
of these so-called "clean" credits has been increasing significantly in the 1970s. Id. at
56 n.2. See generally U.C.C. § 5-102, Official Comment 1.
9. See, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d
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is viewed by the law as separate and independent from the underlying
business transaction between the customer and the beneficiary." The
issuer is under a legal duty to honor demands for payment that com-
ply with the terms of the credit, without reference to the beneficiary's
performance of the underlying contract.
For the beneficiary contemplating a complex sales or service
transaction, especially one carried on over long distances, across in-
ternational boundaries, or with an unfamiliar party, the letter of
credit is an attractive commercial device for two reasons. First, the
beneficiary, who would otherwise have only the customer's assertions
of solvency and good faith as assurance of payment, may rely on the
financial responsibility of an issuing bank." Second, since the rule of
independent contracts requires the issuer to honor the beneficiary's
drafts upon presentment of requisite documents regardless of the
customer's claims of defective performance of the underlying con-
tract, the beneficiary may be assured of payment without equivoca-
tion if the terms and conditions of the credit are met. 12 Any claims of
defective performance raised by the customer must be settled after
payment by suit on the underlying contract. 3
The letter of credit offers a degree of certainty for which parties
to a complex transaction can bargain-certainty without which the
parties may not be able to transact business at all." The letter of
credit is, in effect, a contractual allocation of risk between the cus-
tomer and the beneficiary." By requiring use of a letter of credit, the
Cir. 1970); American Steel Co. v. Irving Nat'l Bank, 266 F. 41, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1920);
Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787
(Sup. Ct. 1949); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31
N.Y.S.2d 631, 633-34 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank,
461 Pa. 343, 357, 336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975).
10. See cases cited in note 9 supra. See also H. HARnFuD, supra note 3, at 31-32.
11. "The essence of the instrument is that it adds the credit of the bank to the
credit of the buyer." H. HARFILD, supra note 3, at 27. See, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1970); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v.
Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 357, 336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975).
12, The letter of credit also offers a degree of certainty from the customer's point
of view. The customer is assured that payment under the credit will take place only
when the beneficiary complies with the terms of the credit as specified in the cus-
tomer's instructions to the issuing bank. In transactions in which the beneficiary is
required to present documents of title under a commercial credit, see note 8 supra, this
allows the customer to defer payment for the goods until they are delivered. See
generally Note, Documentary Letters of Credit and the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits (1974 Revision): A Selective Analysis, 3 J. CORP. L. 147, 148-
51 (1977).
13. See J. WHrr & R. SuMMFnS, supra note 7, § 18-7, at 630-31.
14. See generally B. KOZOLcHYK, supra note 3, at 11-12; Justice, Letters of Credit:
Expectations and Frustrations (pt. 1), 94 BANKING L.J. 424, 427-30 (1977); Note, supra
note 12, at 147-51.
15. See Harfield, supra note 1, at 257-58; Justice, supra note 14, at 427-30.
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beneficiary may greatly reduce his risk of not being paid. But cer-
tainty of payment for the beneficiary is risk of loss for the customer.'"
Since the rule of independent contracts requires the issuer to honor
the drafts of the beneficiary despite defective performance of the
underlying contract, the customer will be without a remedy if, for
some reason, he is unable to make himself whole by suit on that
contract.17
The rule of independent contracts produces desirable commer-
cial results in most cases, as the customer is willing to expose himself
to a risk of loss for the eventual commercial gain he may effect in a
successful transaction. The rule produces questionable results, how-
ever, in one recurring situation: when the transaction is tainted by
the beneficiary's fraud. In cases of beneficiary fraud in which an
action by the customer on the underlying contract would be ineffec-
tual, the rule of independent contracts would operate to unjustly
enrich an unscrupulous beneficiary.
Faced with the harsh results that the rule of independent con-
tracts could produce in these kinds of cases, some courts have con-
cluded that the rule should not protect a fraudulent beneficiary.'"
16. The degree of risk to the customer, like the degree of certainty to the benefici-
ary, is a matter of bargaining between those two parties. If the letter of credit requires
the beneficiary to present extensive documentation evidencing the performance of his
obligations when presenting drafts for payment, the customer exposes himself to rela-
tively little risk in entering the letter of credit agreement. The less evidence required,
the greater risk undertaken. Justice, supra note 14 at 429-30. See note 8 supra & note
35 infra. See also J. WHrrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 7, § 18-7, at 631 (noting the
advantage of third-party certification of performance).
17. A customer's legal remedy for breach of the underlying contract may be
ineffectual for several reasons, but the most common is the impending insolvency of
either the customer or the beneficiary. The nearly insolvent customer may be faced
with bankruptcy if he has to reimburse the issuer without receiving the anticipated
benefits of the underlying contract. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens
& S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1973); NMC Enterprises, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1427, 1429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
And, of course, an action on the underlying contract may be fruitless if the beneficiary
is insolvent at the time of payment or becomes insolvent after disposing of the proceeds
of the credit. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 250 N.W.2d 172,
181-82 (Minn. 1977).
In international transactions, an action on the contract often must be litigated in
the beneficiary's country. Carrying on international litigation may be prohibitively
expensive. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp.
991, 1000 (taking judicial notice of the burden of carrying on international litigation).
18. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Trust Co., 297 F. 152,
158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 585 (1924); Banco Tornquist, S.A. v. American
Bank & Trust Co., 71 Misc. 2d 874, 875, 337 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Balbo
Oil Corp. v. Zigourakis, 40 Misc. 2d 710, 711, 243 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441-42, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779,
790 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. Nat'l City Bank, 35
N.Y.S.2d 985, 988-89 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 268 A.D. 984, 52 N.Y.S.2d 583
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But judicial efforts to balance the commercial utility of letters of
credit against the desire to prevent the unjust enrichment of a de-
frauding beneficiary have been unsatisfactory as well as inconsistent.
Case law prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code was
unclear. Section 5-114 of the Code, 9 in attempting to resolve the
vagaries in the common law, appears merely to have codified them.
Through analysis of both pre-Code and post-Code cases and a
fresh look at the countervailing policies underlying the law of letters
of credit, this Note attempts to justify a new balance between com-
mercial utility and the prevention of unjust enrichment. It suggests
a narrow and well demarcated exception to the rule of independent
contracts that will serve the general purpose of commercial utility
while providing a remedy for victims of intentional fraud in letter of
credit transactions. Finally, this Note proposes a revision of Code
section 5-114 embodying the suggested exception.
II. FRAUD AND THE RULE OF INDEPENDENT
CONRACTS
A. THE Sztejn CASE
In the context of an ordinary breach of the underlying contract
by the beneficiary, the rule of independent contracts is supportable
on the ground that the customer has accepted the risk that payment
may be made despite some defects in the beneficiary's performance."
If the rule were not observed and payment were not made, the par-
ties' expectations and allocations of risk would be upset. Benefici-
aries would soon cease to view letters of credit as means of rapid,
guaranteed payment, and their commercial utility would be lost.2'
As the degree and the mala fides of the beneficiary's breach
increase to the point of fraud, however, this rationale becomes less
persuasive. A number of pre-Code cases thus recognized that a court
of equity could enjoin an issuer from honoring a credit, even though
the beneficiary had presented documents that technically conformed
to its terms, when allowing honor would defraud the customer.2
The landmark case is Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking
(1944); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d
631, 634-35 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Higgins v. Steinhardter, 106 Misc. 168, 169, 175 N.Y.S.
279, 280 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
19. U.C.C. § 5-114.
20. See, e.g., CAL. U. COM. CODE § 5114, California Code Comment 6 (West
1964). See also Harfield, supra note 1, at 257-58.
21. See, e.g., Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 721, 31
N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461
Pa. 343, 357-59, 336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975).
22. See cases cited in note 18 supra.
19791
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Corp.Y The plaintiff there was a New York merchant who had con-
tracted to purchase a quantity of bristles from a supplier in India. In
order to pay for the bristles, the plaintiff also contracted with the
defendant bank for the issuance of an irrevocable commertial letter
of credit 6 in favor of the supplier. After placing fifty cases of material
on board a steamship, the supplier presented a draft, along with the
requisite documents, to the defendant bank for payment. Before the
bank paid the draft, however, the customer brought an action to
enjoin payment. The complaint alleged that the beneficiary had filled
the cases with cowhair and other worthless material with the intent
of defrauding the plaintiff. The bank moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. In considering the motion, the court reaffirmed that
a letter of credit is independent of the underlying contract of sale
between the beneficiary and the customer, but went on to hold,
Of course, the application of this doctrine presupposes that the doc-
uments accompanying the draft are genuine and conform in terms
to the requirements of the letter of credit....
However, . . . a different situation is presented in the instant
action. This is not a controversy between the buyer and seller con-
ceming a mere breach of warranty regarding the quality of the mer-
chandise; on the present motion, it must be assumed that the seller
has intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered by the buyer. In
such a situation, where the seller's fraud has been called to the
bank's attention before the drafts and documents have been pre-
sented for payment the principle of the independence of the bank's
obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended to pro-
tect the unscrupulous beneficiary.2
The Sztejn case thus appeared to set out an exception to the rule
of independent contracts for cases in which the underlying transac-
tion was tainted by beneficiary fraud. As later cases showed, however,
the holding of Sztejn was less than clear."6
23. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
24. An "irrevocable" letter of credit is one in which the issuing bank's obligation
cannot be cancelled or altered unilaterally. The "revocable" credit is one in which the
bank's obligation to pay may be modified or cancelled at any time, without notice to
the beneficiary. Obviously, the beneficiary's certainty of enforcing the bank's promise
in the case of a "revocable" credit is virtually nonexistent until the moment of actual
payment by the bank. See H. HARu'm, supra note 3, at 40-42; B. KOZOLCHYK, supra
note 3, at 19-21. Because of its limited appeal to risk-averse beneficiaries, the
"revocable" letter of credit is very rarely, if ever, used in modern commercial transac-
tions. See H. HARFIELD, supra note 3, at 41.
25. 177 Misc. at 721-22, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
26. See notes 47-56, 66-73 & 103-04 infra and accompanying text.
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B. SEcrION 5-114
The law pertaining to letters of credit has now been codified in
article 5 of the Code.Y The problem of fraud and the doctrine of
independent contracts is dealt with in section 5-114 ,2 which sets out
the issuer's duty to honor drafts presented under the letter of credit
agreement. This section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which
complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether
the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale
or other contract between the customer and the beneficiary....
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their
face to comply with the terms of credit but a required document...
is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if
honor is demanded by. . .a holder in due course. . . ; and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting
in good faith may honor the draft or demand for payment despite
notification from the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not
apparent on the face of the documents but a court of appropriate
jurisdiction may enjoin such honor.'
Subsection (1) of section 5-114 is a restatement of the common
law rule of independent contracts, setting forth the basic principle
that the credit contract must be carried out regardless of the quality
of the beneficiary's performance of the underlying transaction.,,
Subsection (2) outlines the issuer's duty to honor upon present-
27. U.C.C. §§ 5-101 to -117. The special character of article 5 is noteworthy. It
is not a complete "code" like articles 2 and 3, which deal with sales and commercial
paper respectively. R. ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COaMCL. CODE § 5-101:3 (2d ed.
1971). Instead, the article is intended to set up an "independent theoretical framework
for the further development of letters of credit." U.C.C. § 5-101, Official Comment.
The drafters felt that no statute could effectively or wisely codify the law of letters of
credit without hampering development of the device. See U.C.C. § 5-102, Official
Comment 2. Hence, in section 5-102(3), they "ma[de] explicit a court's power to
apply a particular rule by analogy to cases not within its terms, or to refrain from doing
so." Id. The Official Comment goes on to say that article 5 is to be applied in accord
with the canon of liberal interpretation (U.C.C. § 1-102(1)), so as to promote the
underlying purposes and policies of the article. Id.
28. U.C.C. § 5-114.
29. Id. § 5-114(1),(2).
30. The letter of credit is essentially a contract between the issuer and the
beneficiary and is recognized by this Article as independent of the underlying
contract between the customer and the beneficiary . . . .In view of this
independent nature of the letter of credit engagement, the issuer is under a
duty to honor the drafts or demands for payment which in fact comply with
the terms of credit without reference to their compliance with the terms of
the underlying contract.
U.C.C. § 5-114, Official Comment 1.
1979]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ment of documents in the special case in which required documents
are forged or fraudulent, or there is fraud in the transaction. When
these conditions exist the section divides presenters into two classes.
Under subsection (2) (a), if the presenter of the draft is the equivalent
of a holder in due course, the general rule of independent contracts
applies and the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment.
Under subsection (2)(b), however, if the presenter is anything but a
holder in due course, the bank is not obligated to honor. It may honor
despite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery, or other de-
fect not apparent on the face of the documents; and the Official
Comment makes it clear that the issuer in a subsection (2)(b) situa-
tion may also choose not to honor, either by its own volition or when
requested to do so by the customer.' If the subsection (2)(b) condi-
tions exist, and the issuer refuses to dishonor the drafts as requested
by the customer, the customer may seek recourse in a court. Sec-
tion 5-114 may be said, therefore, to allow two sorts of dishonor under
the letter of credit: elective dishonor where an issuer chooses to com-
ply with a customer's request, and injunctive dishonor ordered by a
court.
C. FRAUD IN COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY LETtERS OF CREDIT
In general, letters of credit are used in one of two ways: either as
a mechanism of payment or as a guaranty. When used as a payment
mechanism they are denominated commercial letters of credit.2
When used as guaranties they are called standby letters of credit.
In the typical commercial credit situation, a buyer (customer)
who has entered into a contract for the purchase of goods makes
arrangements with his bank (issuer) for the issuance of a letter of
credit in favor of his seller (beneficiary). By such a credit, the seller
receives payment for the goods upon presentment to the bank of
drafts and specified documents.u
In a typical standby credit situation, involving construction fi-
nancing, for example, a developer (customer) contracts with a con-
struction company (beneficiary) to build an apartment complex. The
construction company wants assurance that it will be paid in full
upon completion of the apartments and, therefore, insists that the
developer obtain from a bank (issuer) a letter of credit that will make
payment available in the event the developer should default. 5
31. Id. at Official Comment 2.
32. Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit-The Controversy
Continues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272, 277 (1978).
33. Id. at 278.
34. Commercial credits are almost always "documentary" rather than "clean"
credits. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 3, at 33 & n.54. See note 8, supra & note 41, infra.
35. Conversely, the developer may hear that the construction company has failed
[Vol. 63:487
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Both the commercial and the more recently developed standby
letters of credit are covered by article 5 of the Code. While the Code
recognizes both types, none of the sections in article 5, including
section 5-114, distinguish between them in any way. An issuer is thus
under the same duty to honor demands for payment under a standby
credit as under a commercial credit.37
Although the issuer's duty as defined by section 5-114 may be the
same in the case of both kinds of letters of credit, its inclinations may
be quite different. A commercial credit, as has already been noted,
is an agreed upon mechanism of payment in a sales transaction. All
parties to the transaction fully expect that it will be drawn upon, and
presentment of drafts by the beneficiary indicates nothing more than
that the underlying transaction appears to be following its intended
course.38 When a beneficiary presents drafts under a commercial
credit, therefore, the issuer will usually pay immediately without
consulting its customer.3'
On the other hand, since a standby credit operates as a guaranty,
the issuer's expectation is that it will not be drawn upon in the nor-
mal course of events.' When drafts are presented under a standby
credit, the issuer has good reason to suspect that there has been a
serious breakdown in relations between the parties to the underlying
transaction. The effect of such notice of problems in the underlying
transaction is to make the issuer reluctant to honor the drafts. If the
bank's customer has refused to pay the beneficiary because of defects
in the beneficiary's performance and the bank honors the draft, the
bank may be forced to sue its customer to obtain reimbursement.
This is obviously undesirable, especially if the customer is important
to the bank. Alternatively, if the customer's failure to pay the benefi-
to complete a number of building projects. He therefore may require the construction
company to secure a letter of credit in his favor, providing liquidated damages in the
event of a default in performance. Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of
Credit, 25 STAN. L. REv. 716, 722 (1973).
Documents required to be presented under a standby letter of credit normally
consist of only a draft accompanied by documents in which the beneficiary certifies
nonperformance by the customer of his obligations under the underlying contract.
Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 32, at 279; Note, Guaranty Letters of Credit: Problems
and Possibilities, 16 ARiz. L. Rav. 822, 827 (1974). Standby credits may also be "clean"
credits. See note 8 supra.
36. See U.C.C. § 5-102, Official Comment 1.
37. See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
38. Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 32, at 277-78.
39. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Judy, Manager, Letter of Credit Area,
Northwestern National Bank, Minneapolis (Nov. 27, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Judy
Interview]; Telephone interview with Ronald Smith, Second Vice-President, Chase
Manhattan Bank, New York City (Nov. 27, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Smith Inter-
view].
40. See Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 32, at 277-78.
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ciary was the result of the customer's insolvency, the issuer may never
be reimbursed even if the claim is litigated."1 Hence, it is the current
practice of issuers to contact the customer and investigate the cir-
cumstances of the transaction upon presentment under a standby
credit."
With these differences in mind, at least one generalization can
be made in regard to section 5-114 and the problem of fraud in the
underlying transaction. The issuer that is in a position to exercise an
elective dishonor under subsection (2)(b) will be more inclined to do
so in the case of the standby credit than in the case of the commercial
credit. A standby issuer is therefore more likely to search for grounds
for elective dishonor and to comply with its customer's request not
to pay on the beneficiary's drafts.
Since standby credits are subject to the same provision as com-
mercial credits, however, issuers have the same duty to honor under
both types of credits." Standby issuers are thus forced to honor drafts
in many situations in which it is not in their best interest to do so.
As a result, issuers have come under considerable criticism for impru-
dent involvement in standby credits."
The differences between the two uses of letters of credit are im-
portant mainly to the issuer in determining whether to commit itself
in credit contracts in the first place. It is up to the issuer to make full
41. A commercial letter of credit usually requires the beneficiary to present
documents of title to the goods being sold to the issuer upon presentment for payment.
In case of the customer's insolvency, these documents provide the issuing bank with
an immediate security interest of some value. The issuer's risk under such a credit is
comparable to that of a secured loan. Verkuil, supra note 35, at 721.
Under guaranty letters of credit the issuer does not receive security upon payment
to the beneficiary. The issuer's only resort is an action against its customer, a party
that has already defaulted on its principal obligation. From a credit risk point of view,
therefore, the standby credit is far more likely to result in loss to the issuer than the
commercial credit. Id. at 727-28.
42. Judy Interview, supra note 39; Smith Interview, supra note 39.
It should be noted that U.C.C. § 5-112 provides that a bank at which a documen-
tary draft or demand for payment has been presented under a credit may, "without
dishonor" of the draft or demand, defer honor until the close of the third banking day
following receipt of the documents. U.C.C. § 5-112(1)(a).
43. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
44. Commentators have suggested that most issuers have a fundamental misun-
derstanding of the sort of risk they are taking by engaging themselves in standby
credits. See Harfield, supra note 1, at 258-59; Verkuil, supra note 35, at 737.
In the past, it has also been argued that banks are acting ultra vires when they
issue standby credits, and that transactions involving them can be declared unenforce-
able. Verkuil, supra note 35, at 724-27. See B. KozoLcwK, supra note 3, at 629-35. It
has also been suggested that standby credits should be included within the lending
limits of issuing banks in order to ensure their solvency. Verkuil, supra note 34, at 739.
See also Katskee, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate-The Case for Congressional
Resolution, 92 BANKING L.J. 697 (1975).
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assessment of the relative risks of entering into a commercial or
standby credit."
III. PROBLEMS IN THE POST-CODE CASES:
THE PROGENY OF SZTEJN AND SECTION 5-114
Section 5-114 is often referred to by courts and commentators as
a codification of the Sztejn case." Such statements are acccurate
inasmuch as Sztejn and section 5-114 appear to set forth a fraud
exception to the rule of independent contracts. They are also accu-
rate inasmuch as section 5-114 does nothing to clear up several ques-
tions left unanswered by Sztejn. For purposes of discussion in the
context of section 5-114, the problems can be categorized as defimi-
tional and structural.
A. DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN SECTION 5-114
Section 5-114 allows dishonor of drafts presented under a letter
of credit when the documents presented are "forged" or "fraudulent,"
or when there is "fraud in the transaction." But neither the Code
itself nor its official comments define these terms or explain the dif-
ferences between them. This omission by the Code drafters has re-
sulted in uncertainty as to the proper standard of fraud, and also as
to the bounds of the "transaction" that can properly be examined in
determining the existence of the fraud.
1. The Standard of Fraud
Courts considering the term "fraud" in the context of section 5-
114 are divided over the degree of beneficiary malfeasance that must
be shown by a party seeking to prevent honor of a letter of credit.
Little guidance on this question can be had from Sztejn. Due to its
procedural posture, the case was decided on the most extreme facts.
The defendant bank had moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action. The court therefore had to assume that the
45. See Harfield, supra note 1, at 258-59; Verkuil, supra note 35, at 739. Com-
mentators are in general agreement that if parties use letters of credit as a guaranty
mechanism, they should still be subject to the rigors of the strict rule of independent
contracts so as not to infect the commercial utility of letters of credit with any new
ambiguities. See Harfield, supra note 1, at 258-59. See also B. KozoLcHYK, supra note
3, at 633-34.
46. See, e.g., Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin. Corp., 44
ll. App. 3d 220, 233, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1318 (1976) (concurring opinion); United Bank,
Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270
(1976). See also B. CLARK, THE LAw OF BANK DEPosrTs, COLLECrIONS AND CEZnrr CARDs
92 (Cum. Supp. No. 1, 1978); Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations
(pt. 2), 94 BANKING L.J. 493, 496 (1977). But see Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit
Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596, 605 (1978).
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allegations of the plaintiff customer were true: that the beneficiary
had intentionally engaged in a scheme to defraud the customer to-
tally. 7
In subsequent cases, various attempts have been made to define
the sort of fraud necessary to allow dishonor. In West Virginia Hous-
ing v. Sroka Development Fund,4" the court asserted,
Neither the Code nor its comments give any hint as to what type of
fraud gives the bank an option to pay or not to pay under this
section. . . . While the courts have been reluctant to define fraud,
it generally is thought to include an element of intentional misrepre-
sentation in order to profit from another."
A contrary position was espoused in Dynamics Corp. of America v.
Citizens & Southern National Bank:50
Fraud has a broader meaning in equity [than at law] . . . and
intention to defraud or misrepresent is not a necessary element.
Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity properly includes
all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal
or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are inju-
rious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advan-
tage is taken of another."1
Yet a third standard was announced in United Bank Ltd. v. Cam-
bridge Sporting Goods:52
[Tihe drafters of section 5-114 . . . in utilizing the term "fraud in
the transaction," have eschewed a dogmatic approach and adopted
a flexible standard to be applied as the circumstances of a particular
situation mandate. It can be difficult to draw a precise line between
cases involving breach of warranty (or a difference of opinion as to
the quality of goods) and outright fraudulent practice on the part
of the seller.n
It is probably unwise to attempt to articulate a comprehensive
definition of fraud, since those inclined to fraudulent practices would
soon find loopholes in the definition.5 Still, given the elusiveness of
47. 177 Misc. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
48. 415 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Penn. 1976).
49. Id. at 1114 (emphasis added). See also NMC Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1427, 1429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("[W]here no
innocent third parties are involved and where the documents or the underlying trans-
action are tainted with intentional fraud . . . the court may grant injunctive relief
restraining ... honor.").
50. 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
51. Id. at 998 (emphasis added) (quoting S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193-94 (1963) quotation of W. DEFUNLu, HANDBOOK OF MOD-
ER Equrry 235 (2d ed. 1956)).
52. 41 N.Y.2d 254, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
53. Id. at 260-61, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (emphasis added).
54. See Stonemets v. Head, 248 Mo. 243, 263, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (1913):
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the concept,"5 it seems equally unwise to use the term without at-
tempting to define it, especially in a statute that must strike a deli-
cate balance between the need to preserve the commercial utility of
the letter and the need to prevent unjust enrichment of the benefici-
ary. Ideally, the standard of fraud should define a degree of malfeas-
ance on the part of the beneficiary beyond which the application of
risk allocation and commercial utility rationale should not be car-
ried."
Of the cases mentioned above, one-Dynamics Corp.5"-is
clearly a step in the wrong direction. The broad, equitable standard
of fraud described in that case would appear to sanction injunctive
relief in cases where the beneficiary's behavior might be more pro-
perly characterized as defective performance. Widespread adoption
of this rule could lead to the use of section 5-114 as a device for
litigating breach of contract, a result that would quickly destroy the
utility of the letter of credit altogether. Also, as discussed above,58 the
reasonableness of the risk-allocation concept varies inversely with the
culpability of the beneficiary's actions. It is clear that the standard
of fraud enunciated in Dynamics Corp. extends well into the range
where it is reasonable to deny the customer an injunction on the
ground that he voluntarily assumed the risk of being left without an
effective remedy for defects in the beneficiary's performance.
The two other cases, Sroka5 ' and United Bank,"5 represent a
movement toward the ideal. The Sroka concept of "intentional mis-
representation"' is an attempt to define the kind of malfeasance
Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite. Fraud being infinite and taking on pro-
tean form at will, were courts to cramp themselves by defining it with a hard-
and-fast definition, their jurisdiction would be cunningly circumvented at
once by new schemes beyond the definition .... [Dlefinitions of fraud are
of set purpose left general and flexible, and thereto courts match their as-
tuteness against the versatile inventions of fraud-doers.
See also Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. Rzy. 749 (1930).
55. Prosser notes that liability for fraud may be based on intent to deceive,
negligence, or strict liability:
There has been a good deal of overlapping of theories, and no little confusion,
which has been increased by the indiscriminate use of the word "fraud," a
term so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case. Further diffi-
culty has been added by a failure to distinguish the requisites of the action
in tort at law from those of equitable remedies, and to distinguish the differ-
ent forms of misrepresentation from one another, and misrepresentation it-
self from mere mistake.
W. PnossEn, HANDBOOK OF THm LAw OF TorS § 105, at 684-85 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted).
56. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
58. See generally text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
59. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
61. 415 F. Supp. at 1114. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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that should be required. The United Bank court, despite its nominal
adherence to a "flexible standard," draws attention to the degree
of malfeasance by indicating that the line must be drawn somewhere
between "breach of warranty . . .and outright fraudulent prac-
tice." 2 Read together, the cases set a standard requiring a showing
of intent combined with some degree of defective performance. What
remains unclear is the point at which the degree of intentionally
defective performance is sufficient to warrant an injunction.
It is impossible, of course, to formulate a general rule of absolute
precision, but an admirable attempt was made in Intraworld Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 3 where the court held,I.
In light of the basic rule of the independence of the issuer's engage-
ment and the importance of this rule to the effectuation of the
purposes of the letter of credit, we think that the circumstances
which will justify an injunction against honor must be narrowly
limited to situations of fraud in which the wrongdoing of the benefi-
ciary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate pur-
poses of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer
be served. A court of equity has the limited duty of "guaranteeing
that [the beneficiary] not be allowed to take unconscientious ad-
vantage of the situation and run off with plaintiff's money on a
pro forma declaration which has absolutely no basis in fact.""
This somewhat disparate case law suggests that some degree of
intent is required, that breach of contract is beyond the scope of
section 5-114, and that breach shades into fraud in the "narrowly
limited" situation where "the legitimate purposes of the independ-
ence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served." A synthesis
of the case law remains somewhat vague, however, and in order to
assure a proper balancing of commercial utility and protection from
fraud, it should perhaps be made clear that the Code contemplates a
strict standard of fraud akin to the common law tort action of deceit.6 '
62. 41 N.Y.2d at 261; 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271. See note 53 supra and accompanying
text.
63. 461 Pa. 343, 336 A.2d 316 (1975).
64. Id. at 359, 336 A.2d at 324-25 (emphasis added) (quoting Dynamics Corp. of
America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 999 (N.D. Ga. 1973)).
65. "[The tort action of deceit requires something in the way of knowledge of
the falsity of the statement and an intention to mislead, while the contract action on
a warranty does not." W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 105, at 685. The elements of the
tort cause of action in deceit have been stated as follows:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case,
this representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the represen-
tation is false-or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient
basis of information to make it. This element often is given the technical
name of "scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action
in reliance upon the misrepresentation.
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2. Fraud in the "Transaction"
Section 5-114 does not make clear whether the phrase "fraud in
the transaction" refers to fraud in the transaction as a whole, encom-
passing the underlying contract, or whether it refers strictly to fraud
in the letter of credit contract between the issuer and beneficiary."
Looking to the Sztejn case for clarification is again not particularly
helpful since it is amenable to both the broad and the narrow reading
of "transaction." On one hand, the court noted that "the principle
of the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of credit
should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous [beneficiary]. '67
In addition, Justice Shientag stated,
Although our courts have used broad language to the effect that a
letter of credit is independent of the primary contract between the
buyer and seller, that language was used in cases concerning alleged
breaches of warranty; no case has been brought to my attention
on this point involving an intentional fraud on the part of the
seller. ... 68
These passages would seem to indicate that Sztejn was announcing
a rather broad exception to the rule of independent contracts under
which a court of equity, presented with a customer's request for an
injunction on grounds of fraud, may examine the underlying contract
and compare the beneficiary's performance with his obligations
thereunder, regardless of the form and contents of the documents
presented under the credit.
On the other hand, the court in Sztejn also stated that the appli-
cation of the doctrine of independent contracts "presupposes that the
documents accompanying the draft are genuine and conform in terms
to the requirement of the letter of credit."" Relying on this language,
courts and commentators have been in general accord that Sztejn is
authority only for the proposition that a document which falsifies the
facts it purports to represent, in order to cover up a beneficiary's
fraud, is a nonconforming document. 0
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plain-
tiff, in taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
Id. at 685-86 (footnotes omitted). See also J. WHrrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 7, § 9-
1; Harfield, supra note 46, at 614-15.
66. See Harfield, supra note 46, at 605.
67. 177 Misc. at 721-22, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
68. Id. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
69. Id. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
70. An illustration of this narrow reading is found in Merchants Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). There, the beneficiary
presented documents under the letter of credit contract showing that goods were placed
on board a ship in Korea not later than January 31, 1968. In fact, the goods were not
loaded until February 13. Citing Sztejn, the court determined that the plaintiff cus-
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Under this narrow interpretation of Sztejn, a court presented
with a request for an injunction may only examine the documents
tendered under the letter of credit contract and determine whether
the assertions made by the beneficiary therein are true or false.' Of
course, if the documents make assertions about performance of the
underlying contract, the court must look to the beneficiary's actual
performance to determine whether the documents are accurate." In
Sztejn, for example, the documents presented stated that fifty crates
of bristles had been delivered.7 1 Only by looking at the beneficiary's
performance of the underlying contract could the court ascertain that
the fifty crates did not contain bristles.
The language of section 5-114 would appear to provide a broader
exception to the rule of independent contracts than the "fraud-
represented-in-the-documents" exception generally attributed to
Sztejn. Section 5-114 allows dishonor not only when a "document
. . . is forged or fraudulent," but also when "there is fraud in the
transaction. 7 On its face, this additional language would seem to
provide for cases of beneficiary fraud where there are no fraudulent
documents; otherwise the "fraud in the transaction" language would
be nugatory.75 Under this broad reading of section 5-114, courts and
issuers would be allowed to look directly to the underlying transaction
upon a customer's allegations of fraud. Their scrutiny of the underly-
ing transaction would not be limited by the precise scope of the
representations made in the presented documents. The beneficiary's
performance of the underlying contract would simply be compared
with his obligations under that agreement to determine whether his
demand for payment constitutes fraud.
Those commentators espousing the narrow view of Sztejn, how-
tomer was entitled to injunctive relief because his dispute with the beneficiary was
"not as to warranty or breach of the contract between the buyer and seller but as to
the terms of the letter of credit, the independent contract between the [beneficiary]
and the issuer." Id. at 197 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage
Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978); Bossier Bank & Trust
Co. v. Union Planter's Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1977); CNA Mortgage
Investors, Ltd. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 540 S.W.2d 238, 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975);
Harfield, supra note 46 at 605; Verkuil, supra note 35, at 720 n.23.
71. See Verkuil, supra note 35, at 720 n.23.
72. See B. KOZOLCY'K, supra note 3, at 464.
73. 177 Misc. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
74. U.C.C. § 5-114(2).
75. See Edgewater Constr. Co. Inc. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin. Corp., 44
Ill. App. 3d 220, 233, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1317-18 (1976) (Jiganti, J., concurring) ("Uni-
form Commercial Code Section 5-114(2)(b) . . . says essentially that even though the
relationship [between the issuer and the beneficiary] is independent of [the] under-
lying contract, the court will still look at that very contract if there is fraud, forgery or
other defect.").
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ever, have adopted a congruently narrow view of section 5-114.76 This
construction of section 5-114 allows dishonor only where the fraud is
represented in the letter of credit contract by falsified documents. To
these commentators, the phrase "fraud in the transaction" means
fraud in the letter of credit contract only, and is a redundant rephras-
ing of "forged or fraudulent" documents. 7
Where documents fraudulently describe the beneficiary's per-
formance of the underlying transaction, dishonor would be allowed
under both the narrow view and the broad view. The distinction
between the narrow and broad views is important, however, in cases
in which the fraud in the transaction is no longer represented by false
statements in the documents. For example, if the document pre-
sented in the Sztejn case had required the beneficiary to state only
that "fifty crates" had been delivered, there could be no fraud found
under the narrow view because there was no fraud in the documents
themselves: they stated that fifty crates had been shipped and that
much was true.78 To take another example, in a "clean" credit there
is no documentation accompanying the drafts presented.7 9 Under the
narrow view, these credits could never be dishonored since there is
no possible fraudulent documentation. 0
Applying the broad view of Sztejn and section 5-114, drafts pre-
sented under either the hypothetical "fifty crates" credit or the clean
credit could be dishonored. Under that approach, a court or issuing
bank would simply compare the beneficiary's performance of the
76. See, e.g., Harfield, supra note 46, at 605-06; Verkuil, supra note 35, at 720
n.23.
77. Thus, while asserting that the phrase "fraud in the transaction" in § 5-114
adds a "new gene" to the Sztejn fraud doctrine Henry Harfield would construe that
language to mean fraud in a transaction "so intimately related to the independent
letter of credit contract as to be an implied term of that contract." Harfield, supra note
46, at 605-06. Harfield, therefore, reaffirms the basic narrow view of Sztejn: the fraud
must be expressly or impliedly represented in the documents of the credit contract in
order for the beneficiary's drafts to be dishonored. The "so intimately related . . . as
to be an implied term" standard is rather vague and it is not clear whether it would
result in the inclusion of more transactions than would the strict reading of Sztejn.
78. It is unclear what the result would be if the "so intimately related. . . as to
be an implied term" test proposed by Henry Harfield were applied to the hypothetical
case. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. If the description of the contents of
the fifty crates as set out in the hypothetical underlying contract would be considered
part of a transaction of sufficiently intimate relation, then the issuer could scrutinize
the actual performance of the beneficiary and the result would be the same as under
the broad view. If it were found not to be so intimately related, the beneficiary's
drafts could be neither electively nor injunctively dishonored.
79. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., CNA Mortgage Investors, Ltd. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 540
S.W.2d 238, 242-43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975). Presumably, the same result would be
reached in the case of the "clean" credit under Harfield's "so intimately related . ..
as to be an implied term" test. See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
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underlying contract with his obligations under it to determine
whether his demand for payment constituted fraud.
Those espousing the narrow interpretation of Sztejn and section
5-114 are faced with the task of explaining why a defrauded customer
should be able to prevent his loss only when the fraud is represented
in the documents. Their arguments are those typically made to jus-
tify the rule of independent contracts." First, the presence or absence
of language in the documents incorporating terms or conditions in the
underlying transaction may be seen as an allocation of risk intended
by the parties.12 If a term or condition was not incorporated, the
customer accepted the risk that the beneficiary would not perform
according to it. The more documentation for which the customer
bargains the less risk he assumes." The customer engaging a clean
credit arrangement thus takes the risk of intentional fraud. Second,
if courts read Sztejn and 5-114 broadly, and upset the expectations
of the parties by reviewing the beneficiary's performance of the un-
derlying contract, letters of credit will no longer be seen as a method
of speedy, assured payment and their commercial usefulness will be
lost.8"
Both of these justifications, however, are susceptible to criticism.
First, as has already been noted, the risk-allocation argument be-
comes somewhat less forceful as the culpability of the beneficiary's
breach of the underlying contract increases.- It is reasonable to infer
that the customer, in order to do business with a certain beneficiary,
would accept limited documentation and thereby assume the foresee-
able risk of some defect in the beneficiary's performance. But it is
much less reasonable to infer that he would voluntarily assume the
far less foreseeable risk of outright fraud. From the beneficiary's
perspective, however, the risk allocation argument is considerably
more convincing. It is reasonable to assume that by bargaining for a
clean credit, a beneficiary is attempting to limit the necessary docu-
mentation in order to avoid any disputes over defective performance
until after he has been paid.
Second, and more importantly, the arguments in favor of the
narrow view, while responsive to the needs of commercial utility, are
not responsive to the policy of preventing unjust enrichment.8
81. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
82. See Justice, supra note 14, at 427-30.
83. A customer may substantially reduce his risk by insisting, for instance, that
a letter of credit in a sale of goods transaction require, in addition to the usual docu-
mentation, a certificate by a responsible third party as to the quality of the goods. See
Harfield, supra note 1, at 258; Justice, supra note 14, at 430. See also notes 8 & 12
supra and accompanying text.
84. See Verkuil, supra note 35, at 720 n.23.
85. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
86. "[T]here is as much public interest in discouraging fraud as in encouraging
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Plainly, the defrauding beneficiary is equally culpable whether or not
the fraud is evidenced in the documents tendered under the letter of
credit. He is being rewarded for his wrongdoing when, under the
narrow view, he is allowed to collect the proceeds of the credit be-
cause the fraud is not represented in the documents.
Perhaps with the policy of preventing unjust enrichment in
mind, some courts, while stating that they are following the narrow
"fraud-in-the-documents-only" approach, have employed that ap-
proach in such a way that the line between it and the broad "fraud-
in-the-whole-transaction" approach has become blurred. For exam-
ple, in Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments,87 the benefici-
ary, attempting to collect under a standby letter of credit, presented
certifications stating that the customer had failed to meet payment
of authorized loans which are payable. The court ostensibly adhered
to the narrow view of section 5-114: "[W]here injunctive relief is
sought, the fraud alleged must be in respect to the documents pre-
sented and not as to the underlying transaction." '88 The court, how-
ever, used the language, "loans which are payable," to incorporate
the underlying loan contract into the letter of credit contract. "The
allegation of fraud made by [the plaintiffs] is appropriate for injunc-
tive relief," the court said, "since it concerns the certifications by
[the beneficiary]." 9 Injunctive relief was granted because, accord-
ing to the loan contract, payment was conditioned on one of two
events, neither of which occurred.
Similarly, in NMC Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc." the beneficiary presented documents that asserted that
the amounts of the drafts being drawn by him were "due and owing."
Again, the court saw this language as incorporating the underlying
sales contract into the letter of credit contract: "If the [underlying]
contract is tainted with fraud in its inducement, then any document
or signed certificate which the letter of credit requires [the benefici-
ary] to submit, as a condition to [the issuer's] honoring the draft,
that the amount covered by the draft 'is due and owing . . .' is
equally tainted."'"
the use of letters of credit." Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
356 F. Supp. 991, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
87. 250 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Minn. 1977).
88. Id. at 180.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
91. Id. at 1430. The court in NMC Enterprises may actually have been employ-
ing the broad, fraud-in-the-whole-transaction approach. The court construed § 5-
114(2)(b) to say that "[w]here no innocent third parties are involved and where the
documents or the underlying transaction are tainted with intentional fraud, the draft
need not be honored by the bank, even though documents conform on their face...
and the court may grant injunctive relief restraining such honor .... ." Id. at 1429
(emphasis added).
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These courts were at least trying to maintain the appearance of
following the narrow view: the documents stated that the amount was
"payable" or "due and owing" when it was not. But the courts were
not adhering to the underlying rationale of the narrow view-risk
allocation. It is unlikely that the beneficiaries in Shaffer and NMC
Enterprises, contemplated that the underlying contract was to be
incorporated into the letter of credit contract when they agreed to
submit documents stating that the amount drawn under the credit
was "payable" or "due and owing." It seems clear that the courts in
these cases were primarily concerned with preventing unjust enrich-
ment of the beneficiary, and used the "payable" or "due and owing"
language only to remain formally within the accepted method of anal-
ysis. It remains to be seen how far courts will go in using language
such as "loans which are payable" and "due and owing" as means
for investigating fraud in the underlying transaction in order to pre-
vent unjust enrichment of the beneficiary. A representation of
"payment due and owing" could conceivably be implied in the pres-
entation of drafts under any kind of credit, including a "clean"
credit." If this were done, of course, the distinction between the nar-
row and the broad views of Sztejn and section 5-114 would disappear
entirely.
It is quite clear that adopting the broad view of Sztejn and sec-
tion 5-114 would take a toll on the commercial utility of letters of
credit.93 It would prevent the beneficiary from allocating risk in such
a way as to ensure payment prior to litigation in those cases in which
a customer rightfully or wrongfully alleges intentional fraud.94 Since
92. Courts probably would not even have to go so far as to imply such a represen-
tation out of thin air. As Harfield points out, the "clean" credit, in modem usage,
almost always requires that drafts be presented with some specified writing. H.
HARFiELD, supra note 3, at 56 n.2. Although that writing usually will not refer directly
to the provisions of the underlying transaction, it may provide a sufficient foothold for
a court to incorporate those terms as was done in Shaffer and NMC Enterprises.
93. See, e.g., Harfield, supra note 46, at 605-06; Verkuil, supra note 35, at 720
n.23.
94. In discussing the reasons why the provision allowing injunctive dishonor was
dropped entirely from the California version of § 5-114, the official commentators
noted that allowing customers to seek injunctions generally defeats the purposes of risk
allocation:
[Ilt is important to keep in mind the reason for the issuance of the letter of
credit in the first place. It is because the seller wants assurance of being paid
without equivocation, and the essence of the transaction is that it throws the
risk on the buyer of pursuing the seller in his own country with any claim of
breach of contract. It seems improper to destroy this basic understanding of
the parties whenever the buyer raises a claim of "fraud." If the injunction is
issued, then the seller must pursue the buyer in his country in a breach of
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all customers who allege fraud in the underlying transaction would
be allowed to seek dishonor of a beneficiary's drafts by injunction or
by requesting it of the issuing bank, the number of times fraud allega-
tions would result in delay of payment" or dishonor would doubtless
increase. Since the beneficiary could not bargain away the risk of
delay or dishonor-for example, by demanding a "clean" credit-the
letter of credit would become a less attractive commercial device for
wary beneficiaries.
Obviously, the problem with the broad view is not that it would
prevent unjust enrichment in those cases in which the customer has
a legitimate fraud claim:9" the problem is that giving all customers
the right to seek dishonor by alleging fraud would encourage unscru-
pulous or overanxious customers to raise specious claims that would
delay payment and force the beneficiary into litigation. 7 If this abuse
could be minimized, however, the broad view would be an attractive
solution to the problem of fraud in the underlying transaction, pre-
venting unjust enrichment of the beneficiary regardless of the form
and content of the documents presented under the credit.
What is needed, then, is a way of limiting fraud claims that are
allowed to cause a delay in payment to those claims with a basis in
fact. The narrow view of Sztejn and section 5-114 simply limits the
class of customers who can seek dishonor, through the issuer or by
injunction, to those who can show fraud in the documents. By limit-
ing the number of potential fraud claimants, the narrow view ob-
contract action.
CAL. U. COM. CODE § 5114, California Code Comment 6 (West 1964) (quoting sixth
progress report to the legislature by Senate Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary
(1959-1961) Part I, the Uniform Commercial Code 494-95).
95. The delay of payment resulting from a customer's fraud allegations, even if
the allegations are specious, may last from several days to several years. If a customer
seeks dishonor by injunction, the beneficiary may be deprived of payment until after
preliminary hearings reveal the baselessness of the customer's claim. Although such a
delay would not be very long, it could do great damage to a beneficiary who has relied
on timely payment. In the event that a customer seeks dishonor by the issuer, the delay
may be considerably longer. The beneficiary would not be able to secure payment until
he vindicated himself by a wrongful dishonor action against the issuer, see U.C.C. §
5-115, or an action on the underlying contract against the customer. Such litigation
may delay payment for years. Moreover, the beneficiary may be forced to maintain
these actions in the customer's or issuer's country.
96. It would be ridiculous, of course, to argue that a beneficiary actually bargains
for the right to defraud the customer. The commercial utility argument is also inappos-
ite in cases of actual fraud since there is no policy in favor of encouraging fraud feasors
to use letters of credit as a commercial device to achieve their unscrupulous ends.
97. See CAL. U. COM. CODE § 5114, California Code Comment 6 (West 1964),
quoted at note 94 supra. Commentators have decried the drastic effect that unbridled
application of principles of equity can have on commercial utility. See, e.g., Harfield,
supra note 1, at 256-57; Justice, supra note 46, at 498; Verkuil, supra note 35, at 720
n.23; Harfield, Code, Customs and Conscience in Letter-of-Credit Law, 4 U.C.C.
L.J. 7, 9-15 (1971).
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viously reduces the total number of fraud claims made. It does not,
however, limit them in a way that is specifically designed to separate
valid claims from specious ones. A better method of limiting the
fraud claims raised would be one that gives initial scrutiny to the
validity of the claim of fraud in the underlying transaction, rather
than one that merely verifies that certain terms were present in the
documentation. In order to restrict the number of claims raised in a
way that is responsive to equity, what is needed is a limit not on the
class of customers who can seek dishonor, but on the way such dis-
honor may be sought. 8 Such a restriction can be effected by resolving
structural problems of section 5-114.
B. STRuCTuRAL PROBLEMS IN SECTION 5-114
Section 5-114(2)(b) provides that when there is "fraud in the
transaction," an issuer "may" either honor the beneficiary's demand
for payment," or refuse to honor it.'1 If the issuer elects to honor,
however, subsection (2)(b) states that a court "may enjoin such
honor."'' Thus, as previously noted, section 5-114 creates two kinds
of dishonor: elective and injunctive. 2 The section makes no distinc-
tion between showings the customer must make in seeking elective
or injunctive dishonor. An issuer, upon a showing by its customer that
there has been "fraud in the transaction," may lawfully exercise an
elective dishonor; in the alternative, upon the same showing of "fraud
in the transaction" by the customer, a court may grant an injunctive
dishonor.
Despite identical treatment of elective and injunctive dishonor
situations on the face of section 5-114, case law both prior and subse-
quent to the adoption of the Code seems to recognize that they are
distinct and involve different considerations. Sztejn did not address
the problem of differentiating between issuer-initiated and court-
ordered dishonor, but Justice Shientag, in a subsequent opinion,
Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. National City Bank,'13 sug-
gested that factors considered by an issuing bank in deciding whether
to honor a credit should not be the same as those that a court would
use in deciding whether to enjoin honor of that same credit. Asbury
98. See notes 114-20 infra and accompanying text.
99. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b).
100. Id. § 5-114, Official Comment 2.
101. Id. § 5-114(2)(b).
102. See text following note 31 supra. By implication, U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) also
creates a mandatory dishonor situation for the issuer when a draft or demand is
accompanied by documents that have defects apparent on their face. The issuer's duty
to dishonor in such a case is nothing more than a requirement of good faith on the part
of the issuer.
103. 35 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 268 A.D. 984, 52 N.Y.S.2d 583
(1944).
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Park involved a customer who had requested his issuer to dishonor
his beneficiary's drafts because he was being defrauded. The issuer,
however, continued to honor the beneficiary's drafts despite the pleas
of the customer. A suit resulted when the issuer subsequently sold
some of the customer's property in order to obtain reimbursement for
the payments made under the credit. In holding that the issuer was
within its rights in honoring the drafts, the court reasoned that
"[t]he common law fraud action is one of the most difficult to prove,
and the issuing banks cannot be expected to evaluate the soundness
of the . . . claim."'04
In post-Code cases, courts have continued to show a reluctance
to allow issuing banks to evaluate the fraud claims of their custom-
ers."' The fraud exception to the rule of independent contracts has
seen none of the broadening in the elective dishonor cases that it has
in injunctive dishonor cases such as Shaffer and NMC Enterprises. "I
For example, in Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters National
Bank,' an elective dishonor case with facts similar to those in
Shaffer, the beneficiary was required to present a draft and docu-
ments stating that he was "entitled to draw against this letter of
credit in reduction of the loan made by the [beneficiary] to [the
customer]."" 8 The defendant issuer maintained that the beneficiary
fraudulently "called" the letter of credit, because the beneficiary
sought to have it honored for a purpose not contemplated by the
parties to the underlying contract. The underlying contract, argued
the issuer, was incorporated by reference into the letter of credit
contract through the "entitled to draw" language. The court, how-
ever, disagreed:
As we have ... concluded that the underlying contract should not
be looked to, and that Bossier has complied with the terms of the
letter of credit, we must reject defendant's fraud argument. More-
over, the type fraud contemplated in the statute is not the type
fraud which the defendant asserts is present here. The Code seems
to cover fraud in the factum and not fraudulently calling the letter
of credit."'
In effect, then, the court strictly applied the narrow view of Sztejn
and section 5-114 in not allowing the issuer to look to the underlying
transaction in order to determine the truth or falsity of the "entitled
104. Id. at 989.
105. Cf. B. CLAK, supra note 46, at 101 (noting that courts seem more willing
to review elements of the underlying contract in injunctive dishonor cases than in
elective dishonor cases).
106. See notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text.
107. 550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1977).
108. Id. app. A, at 1081.
109. Id. at 1082.
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to draw" statement made in the documents. Similarly, in Pringle-
Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern National Bank,"0 another
elective dishonor case, the court determined that assertions made in
letter of credit documents must be read without reliance on the
underlying contract.
The beneficiary's noncompliance with the underlying contract does
not affect the issuer's liability unless a reference to the underlying
contract explicitly creates a condition for honoring a draft. General
reference to underlying agreements are surplusage and should not be
considered in deciding whether the beneficiary has complied with
the terms of the letter of credit."'
Bossier and Pringle are clearly inconsistent with the injunctive
dishonor cases, Shaffer and NMC Enterprises, in which mere "due
and owing" language in the letter of credit contracts gave the courts
a foothold for looking to the underlying transaction. That the case law
should treat elective and injunctive dishonor differently, however, is
not surprising. Strong arguments can be made for prohibiting an
issuer from basing elective dishonor on its own assessment of fraud
in either the underlying transaction or in the documents presented
under the letter of credit. Issuers will rarely possess the legal knowl-
edge necessary to assess whether the beneficiary's actions constitute
fraud. This deficiency is compounded when the parties involved pro-
vide the issuer with self-serving versions of the "facts" of the transac-
tion."' In addition, the issuer will often be in no position to make a
neutral judgment: it may be predisposed towards the credit in order
to protect its reputation in the letter of credit market; alternatively,
it may be afraid of alienating an important customer and therefore
will look hard to find a reason for dishonoring the credit."' In con-
trast, courts are designed to provide a neutral forum for resolution of
both the factual and legal questions involved.
Eliminating the issuer's right of elective dishonor in cases in
which the customer alleges fraud would tend to increase commercial
utility of letters of credit. It would eliminate the disruption caused
when issuing banks wrongfully dishonor either out of allegiance to
their customer, out of self-interest, or through mistake."' Customers
could then secure dishonor only by petitioning a court for an injunc-
tion. By limiting the customer's recourse to injunctive dishonor alone,
all fraud allegations would be subjected to judicial scrutiny before
they are allowed to cause a delay in payment under.the credit.
If courts rigorously observe the prerequisites for injunctive relief,
110. 571 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1978).
111. Id. at 874 (citations omitted).
112. See note 104 supra and accompanying text; Note, supra note 35, at 842-44.
113. See Justice, supra note 46, at 505-06.
114. See notes 42-44 & 103-13 supra and accompanying text.
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the greater burden imposed on the customer will decrease the number
of frivolous or purely dilatory fraud claims. Specifically, the court
should first require the plaintiff customer to show that his legal rem-
edy is inadequate:" 5 that if payment is made to the beneficiary, the
customer will have no effective damage action for breach of the un-
derlying contract."' Second, injunctive relief should not be granted
except on clear evidence of the validity of the customer's claim on the
merits."7 Even a substantial dispute as to the facts should furnish a
strong. reason to deny relief."" Third, the court should take into ac-
count the damage to the beneficiary if it should turn out that relief
to the customer was improper. Against this, the court should balance
115. See Harfield, supra note 46, at 612-14. See also Interco, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 560 F.2d 480, 484-86 (1st Cir. 1977); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apart-
ments, 250 N.W.2d 172, 181-82 (Minn. 1977); NMC Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1427, 1430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). See generally
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.5, at 57-62, 108 (1973).
116. A demonstration of the imminent insolvency of either himself or the benefi-
ciary may satisfy the customer's burden. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Shaffer v. Brooklyn
Park Garden Apartments, 250 N.W.2d 172, 181-82 (Minn. 1977); NMC Enterprises,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1427, 1430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1974). See also D. DOBBS, supra note 115, § 2.5 at 57. It is unclear whether a showing
of the hardships of being compelled to carry on international litigation will itself be
sufficient. Compare Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F.
Supp. 991, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (taking judicial notice of the burden of international
litigation while granting an injunction) with CAL. U. COM. CODE § 5114, California
Code Comment 6 (West 1964) (asserting that the customer accepts the risk of interna-
tional litigation when he enters into a letter of credit transaction). See Harfield, supra
note 46, at 612-14.
The character of the beneficiary should perhaps be taken into consideration in
determining whether an action on the underlying contract will be effectual. If the
customer can make a preliminary showing of sufficiently severe beneficiary fraud, that
in itself may indicate that no action will be maintainable once the beneficiary is paid:
If a seller i$ willing to risk the consequences of a criminal action on fraud, it
is quite likely that his assets are either virtually nonexistent or so well hidden
that an action in restitution by the distant purchaser would result in nothing
but an expensive academic victory for the purchaser.
B. KOzOLCHYK, supra note 3, at 282.
117. See Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 250 N.W.2d 172, 181
(Minn. 1977). See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 115, § 2.10, at 108-09. In order to
make a showing of the validity of the fraud claim sufficient to secure preliminary re-
lief, the customer will have to pass two important substantive thresholds. First, he
will have to show that the presenter of the drafts was not a holder in due course. If
the presenter was a holder in due course, the customer will be unable to secure dis-
honor no matter how egregious the fraud. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a). If the customer can
pass the first threshold by showing that the presenter was not a holder in due course,
he must then give sufficient preliminary evidence of the beneficiary's fraud. The stan-
dard of fraud to be used should be quite extreme. See notes 59-65 supra and accom-
panying text. See generally Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 250 N.W.2d
172 (Minn. 1977).
118. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 115, § 2.10, at 108-09.
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the injury that will occur to the customer if relief is wrongly denied."9
There are also procedural safeguards available to courts that will
further prevent abuse by unscrupulous customers and damage to
commercial utility. For example, the customer could be required to
give security-by posting a bond, for instance-to further protect the
beneficiary in the event a preliminary injunction is improperly is-
sued.10
Although it reduces the issuer's flexibility somewhat, elimina-
tion of elective dishonor, in the long run, may be in the best interests
of the issuing bank. Under section 5-114, an issuer electing to dis-
honor a draft on grounds of fraud may be liable to the presenter if it
is subsequently shown that the presenter was a holder in due
course.' 2 ' Under that section, furthermore, if the issuer refuses to
honor a draft in reliance on what is later determined to be a baseless
claim of fraud, the issuer will again be liable to the presenter.'2
Finally, the issuer's liability for wrongful dishonor is not limited to
119. See generally Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 250 N.W.2d
172, 181-82 (Minn. 1977); D. DOBBS, supra note 115, § 2.10, at 108-09.
120. See Shaffer v. Brooklyn- Park Garden Apartments, 250 N.W.2d 172, 182
(Minn. 1977). See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 115, § 2.10, at 106-07. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as most state rules require that the plaintiff provide
a bond in cases of preliminary equitable relief. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c). See, e.g., ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 69 § 9 (Smith-Hurd 1959 & Supp. 1978); MINN. R. Civ. P. 65.03(1); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAw & R. § 6312 (McKinney 1963); PA. R. Civ. P. 1531; TEx. R. Civ. P.
ANN. 684 (Vernon 1967). Since most rules requiring bonds give courts discretion to set
them in such an amount "as the court deems proper," see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c),
courts should take into consideration not only the potential harm to the beneficiary,
but also the importance of commercial utility and the need to discourage marginal
claims.
121. U.C.C. §§ 5-114(2)(a), 5-115(1). This view is also reflected in a Minnesota
group research project:
Under Subsection (2)(b), which deals with the situation in which the
presenter of the draft is not a holder in due course, the issuer may but is not
required to honor the draft. This accords with prior law....
Local banking practice, in this situation, is for the issuer to refuse to
honor the draft and let the holder and prior interested parties settle their
claims and seek recourse against the beneficiary. This practice would proba-
bly be changed in view of the provisions in this subsection (2), since under
these provisions, the safest practice for the issuer would appear to be to honor
the drafts in all cases where there is apparent compliance unless restrained
by court order. The issuer is protected by paragraph (b) in so doing, whereas
if it elects to dishonor a draft, it is subject to liability to the holder under
paragraph (a) if, in a suit against the issuer, the holder proves that he is a
holder in due course.
S. KINYON & R. McCLuRE, A STUDY OF THE EFFEcr OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ON MINNESOTA LAW 575 (1964), reprinted in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.5-114, Minnesota
Code Comment, Subsection 5-114(2) (West 1976).
122. See Justice, supra note 46, at 497; Mentschicoff, How to Handle Letters of
Credit, 19 Bus. LAW. 107, 111 (1963).
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the amount of the dishonored draft. Incidental damages may also be
awarded a beneficiary whose demand for payment has been wrong-
fully dishonored."'
Under the present section 5-114, a bank may be pressured into
elective dishonor by an influential customer,"4 thus exposing itself to
liability in an eventual wrongful dishonor suit. If only injunctive
dishonor is allowed, the bank will be able to follow the more certain
course of honoring drafts in all cases unless it is presented with a
court oxder. If the bank perceives a serious danger of not being reim-
bursed by a client alleging fraud, it should be allowed to seek an
injunction itself.2'
Banks should retain the power of elective dishonor only when the
documents or drafts presented by a beneficiary are forged. In such
cases, the issuer is in a much better position to determine the validity
of a customer's claims. Banks are accustomed to dealing with prob-
lems of forgery, unlike other problems of fraud. In cases of forgery the
bank may limit its scrutiny to the face of the documents presented.
IV. A SUGGESTED REVISION OF SECTION 5-114
Solving the problem of fraud and the letter of credit requires that
the poorly drafted section 5-114 be revised. First, the term "fraud"
should be defined in the section and its accompanying official com-
ment. Although a precise definition may be impossible, the statute
should at least indicate that the beneficiary's malfeasance must be
intentional and that the defectiveness of his performance must be
extreme. Second, the very different elective and injunctive dishonor
situations should be treated separately. Issuers should never be per-
mitted to look beyond the documents presented. Their scrutiny of
those documents should be strictly limited to examination for facial
conformity to the requirements of the letter of credit contract 2 ' and
detection of f9rgery. In entertaining petitions for injunction based on
allegations of customer fraud, however, courts should not be limited
by the words of the documents presented to the issuing bank. In order
to prevent unjust enrichment, they should be able to examine the
beneficiary's performance of the underlying transaction directly. In
123. U.C.C. § 5-115(1). See also Justice, supra note 46, at 497.
124. See Justice, supra note 46, at 505.
125. Cf. B. KOzoLCHYK, supra note 3, at 281 n.1 (discussing injunction ordering
the beneficiary not to draw under the credit).
126. Issuers should also be able to examine the documents to determine whether
they conform to "the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title
(Section 7-507) or of a security (Section 8-306)," as U.C.C. § 5-114(2) already provides.
This right to reject documents not in conformity with warranties is necessary for the
issuer to protect its security interest in property being transferred in the underlying
transaction. See note 41 supra.
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order to preserve the commercial utility of letters of credit, though,
the section and comment should reaffirm that the full panoply of
equitable prerequisites will prevent specious fraud claims from caus-
ing delay in payment.
The following is a proposed revision of Section 5-114, accompa-
nied by a proposed comment.'1
(1) [Subsection (1) is unchanged.]12
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on
their face to comply with the terms of a credit but a required
document is forged or does not in fact conform to the warran-
ties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title
frete-r-there4s-frati 4e-tianse etion
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for pay-
ment if honor is demanded by a negotiating bank or other
holder of the draft or demand which has taken the draft or
demand under the credit and under circumstances which
would make it a holder in due course (Section 3-302) and in
an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a docu-
ment of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a
bona fide purchaser of a security (Section 8-302); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer
acting in good faith may honor the draft or demand for pay-
ment despite notification from the customer of fiauA, forgery
or nonconformity to warranties etherdefeet-nt-apelrent-en
(3) When documents on their face comply with the terms
of a credit but a required document is forged or does not in
fact conform to the warranties made on negotiation or trans-
fer of a document of title (Section 7-507) or of a security
(Section 8-306), or when under all the circumstances pay-
ment would constitute a fraud upon the issuer or customer,
and when honor is demanded by one other than a negotiating
bank or other holder of the draft or demand that has taken
the draft or demand under the credit and under circumstan-
ces that would make it a holder in due course (Section 3-302)
and in an appropriate case would make it a person to whom
a document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502)
or a bona fide purchaser of a security (Section 8-302) a court
127. Additions to the current section are italicized; deletions are indicated by
128. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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of appropriate jurisdiction, upon application of the issuer or
customer, may enjoin honor of the credit.'9
Proposed Comment:
[Subsection (1) is unchanged.]
Subsection (2) allows an issuing bank a limited right to dishonor
a credit even though the documents appear on their face to comply
with the credit. The right accrues only when a required document is
forged or does not conform to the warranties arising under other Arti-
cles of'the Code.
Subsection (3) allows a court of appropriate jurisdiction to exam-
ine the underlying transaction when the customer or the issuing bank
raises a claim of fraud. But, in light of the basic rule of the independ-
ence of the issuer's engagement and the importance of this rule to the
effectuation of the purposes of the letter of credit, the circumstances
that will justify an injunction against honor are intended to be nar-
rowly limited to situations of fraud in which the wrongdoing of the
beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate
purposes of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served. Hence,
the subsection contemplates a strict standard of fraud that includes
an element of intentional misrepresentation on the part of the benefi-
ciary. In addition, courts granting injunctions under this section
should strictly adhere to the traditional prerequisites for equitable
relief. The moving party should be required to show that his legal
remedy is inadequate, that he is likely to prevail on the merits, and
that damage to the beneficiary if relief is improperly granted would
be less than damage to the moving party if relief is improperly de-
nied. Furthermore, the customer should be required to provide secu-
rity, in the form of a bond, in an amount that the court deems ade-
quate to protect the beneficiary.
V. CONCLUSION
Essentially, the suggested revised statute and accompanying
comment make three important changes in the existing statute. First,
in subsection (2), dealing with injunctive dishonor, the revision elimi-
nates the issuer's "privilege" to dishonor when documents are
"fraudulent" or there is "fraud in the transaction." By eliminating
the issuer's elective dishonor for fraud, the revision would reduce
wrongful dishonor litigation and would increase the utility of letters
of credit by making the issuer's promise to pay more certain. It would
also make more acute the need for the issuer's careful assessment of
129. Subsection (3) is entirely new. Existing subsection (3) would become
subsection (4) in the revised version of § 5-114; existing optional subsections (4) and
(5) would become subsections (5) and (6) respectively.
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the risk prior to commitment in a letter of credit arrangement, espe-
cially in the standby context where issuers have been eager to exercise
elective dishonors in the past.3 ' Second, in subsection (3), concerning
injunctive dishonor, the revision explicitly empowers the court to
consider "all the circumstances" including (and especially) the un-
derlying contract. This affords the customer and the issuer full pro-
tection from fraud regardless of the form of credit. Finally, the com-
ment makes it clear that an injunction against honor may issue only
when the customer or issuer can show a very serious misrepresen-
tation by the beneficiary and can satisfy the prerequisites for equit-
able relief. The revised statute thus gives some certainty to a con-
fused area of commercial law, providing relief from fraud to the cus-
tomer or issuer while preserving the commercial utility of letters of
credit.
130. See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
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